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After a brief review of the literature to the early 1970s, this paper assesses 
the contributions during the past three decades to measuring the distortionary effects 
of trade policies. It does not pretend to be comprehensive, but draws on selections 
from the literature that give a sense of the distance the profession has travelled from 
a trade policy practitioner’s viewpoint since Corden’s first paper on the subject in 
1957. Phenomenal though that progress has been, there is ample room for further 
improvement in computing the economic (and other) effects of trade-related policies 
and their reform. The paper concludes with suggestions of where the priorities should 
be in global modelling of trade policy reform, as the world moves into the next round 
of multilateral trade negotiations. 
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kym.anderson@adelaide.edu.au  This celebration of Max Corden’s academic achievements provides an 
appropriate time to reflect on how far the international economics profession has 
progressed in measuring the extent and effects of trade policy distortions. Calculations 
of the extent of protection from import competition took a giant leap following the 
development and popularisation by Corden (plus Balassa and others) of the effective 
rate of protection concept in the 1960s. Subsequently, our abilities to empirically 
estimate the effects of protection on such things as production, consumption, trade, 
and national and global economic welfare and its distribution also have developed 
rapidly.  
This paper begins with a brief review of the literature to the early 1970s 
(which is surveyed in detail in Corden 1975) and then focuses on contributions during 
the past three decades. It does not pretend to be comprehensive, especially since there 
is a lengthy survey available in Feenstra (1995). Rather, it simply draws on selections 
from that literature to give a sense of the distance the profession has travelled from a 
trade policy practitioner’s viewpoint since Corden’s first paper on the subject in 1957. 
Phenomenal though that progress has been, there is ample room for further 
improvement in our computational efforts. The paper concludes with suggestions of 
where the priorities should be in global modelling of trade policy reform, as the world 
moves into the next round of multilateral trade negotiations (the first since the 
conversion of the GATT Secretariat into the World Trade Organization following the 
completion of the Uruguay Round in 1994). 
 
1.  Measuring the extent of protection  
 
  Trade policy distortions can be due to taxes or subsidies on imports or exports, 
or quantitative restrictions on trade volumes (including trade bans) or values (as with 
WTO-condoned sanctions – see Anderson 2002b). Trade can be also distorted by 
interventions in foreign exchange markets, and of course by myriad domestic policy 
interventions such as output, input and factor taxes and subsidies. But over recent 
centuries perhaps the most common trade distortionary measure, and certainly the one 




Aggregate tariff level indicators 
 
  To measure the extent of a country’s aggregate tariff protection against import 
competition, attention focused initially on developing tariff level indexes. Early 
efforts include studies by Crawford (1934) and Carmody (1952) for Australia 
(infamous for having perhaps the highest manufacturing tariffs in the OECD in the 
twentieth century – see Anderson and Garnaut 1987), plus Loveday (1929), Liepmann 
(1938) and the League of Nations (1927) more generally. One of the problems with 
any aggregate measure, however, is that it cannot serve equally well all purposes 
simultaneously. Domestic uses for the index could be as an indication of the aggregate 
degree of resource re-allocation towards protected industries and/or of taxation of 
consumption of importables, or of foregone welfare gains from trade. International 
uses such as by trading partners could be as an indication of the degree of restriction 
                                                 
1 In earlier centuries a common international trade barrier was state-condoned piracy on the high seas. 
See, for example, the popular history of the spice trade from 1553 to 1667 by Milton (1999), which 
gives a vivid account of the early days of intercontinental maritime commerce between Europe and 
Southeast Asia.  2
 
on import market access. These and other measurement issues associated with 
aggregate tariff level indicators are discussed in Michaely (1977).  
 
Intra-sectoral resource re-allocation indicators: the effective rate of protection 
 
  In terms of indicators of resource re-allocation, substantial progress followed a 
paper on Canada’s protection by Barber (1955), from which Corden (1963) developed 
and applied to Australia the concept of the effective rate of protection (ERP).
2 The 
distinction between nominal and effective protection is that the former measures the 
extent to which the tariff raises the domestic price of a producer’s output whereas the 
latter indicates the extent to which the producer’s value added is enhanced, taking into 
account any tariffs on importable intermediate inputs and the share of the industry’s 
value added in the value of final output.  
The ERP concept gained immediate recognition as a practical way of 
indicating more appropriately the level of industry protection against import 
competition not only in aggregate for a country but also – and more importantly -- 
between industries within a country. Its first official use was by the Australia 
Government with the publication of the Vernon Report (Vernon et al. 1965), to which 
Max Corden contributed; and the first major academic journal publication with cross-
country estimates came out at the same time (Balassa 1965). The next few years saw 
an avalanche of both theoretical and empirical ERP papers and reports. In his first 
seminal book, Corden (1971) brings together most of the key theoretical ideas, while 
his survey of empirical studies (Corden 1975) covers the first decade of quantitative 
applications of the concept. The early empirical work includes numerous comparative 
studies of both industrial countries (Balassa et al. 1967) and developing countries 
(Little, Scitovsky and Scott 1970; Balassa et al. 1971), a testament to its widespread 
popularity. A striking feature of this literature is the genuine interaction between 
theory and empirical work, and between academic researchers and the policy 
community including the GATT (see, for example, the conference proceedings 
volume edited by Grubel and Johnson 1971). 
These studies reveal many things (see Greenaway and Milner (2002) for more 
details), but four points in particular are worth mentioning here. First, the estimated 
EPRs far exceed nominal rates of protection (NRPs), suggesting that the resource 
pulls and hence costs of protection are much greater than the NRPs on their own 
might suggest. Second, the differences between NRPs and ERPs are not constant 
across countries, so that ERPs are to be preferred to NRPs for cross-country 
comparisons of the extent of protection. Third, while the NRP and ERP rankings of 
industries within countries are not greatly different when the degree of aggregation is 
fairly high, the rank correlation falls as the degree of disaggregation increases. This 
means ERPs are also better than NRPs for across-industry comparisons within a 
country, since the resource-pull cost of protection tends to increase with the range of 
ERPs, particularly within sub-sectors where substitution in production is high. And 
fourth, the ERPs expose a non-trivial number of industries where value added has 
been negative at international prices even though those activities were privately 
profitable because of the height of protection on the final product – clearly extreme 
cases of resource wastefulness. 
                                                 
2 The history of the concept of protection on inputs affecting value added goes back more than a 
century. See Corden (1971, Appendix 1). 3
 
Since its first adoption officially in Australia, the EPR concept has been 
broadened to the effective rate of assistance (ERA) to industries, so as to capture in 
principle all forms of governmental assistance to producers.
3 This is helpful not only 
for those concerned with national resource allocation but also for trade negotiators, 
given the increasing tendency of negotiators to focus also on trade-related measures 
inside national borders as border protection falls. 
 
Indicators of consumer price distortions 
 
The ERP is of course not relevant as an indicator of the tariff’s distortionary 
effect on consumption. Simple comparisons of the domestic wholesale price and the 
border price are more appropriate. The OECD has developed the latter further to 
calculate its so-called consumer subsidy equivalent (CSE) of agricultural policies 
(taking into account any direct government subsidies or taxes on consumers of the 
product concerned in addition to the tariff), to match its producer subsidy equivalent 
(PSE) measure.
4 While this is useful for simple comparisons between commodities, it 
has a similar weakness to the rate of producer protection concept in that the 
consumption, trade and economic welfare costs of that distortion due to the tariff 
depend not only on the price wedge but also on the own- and cross-price elasticities of 
demand, or the elasticities of substitution in consumption. And how any particular 
household’s spending is affected depends also on the share of expenditure on each 
item in the household’s consumption bundle.  
 
Trade restrictiveness indicators 
 
Useful though the ERP/ERA concept is, it does not give policy makers and 
trade negotiators very reliable indications of the trade and welfare effects of 
distortionary policies. Certainly partial and general equilibrium modelling can provide 
that, as discussed in the next section, but those models can require a great deal of 
information and analytical input that is often not readily available, particularly in 
developing countries. With that in mind, a single indicator of the trade-distorting and 
welfare-reducing effects of price and trade policies was developed in the 1990s for the 
World Bank, by Anderson and Neary (1994). Their trade restrictiveness index (TRI) 
requires somewhat more computation than just the NRP, but it provides a much more 
accurate indication of the effects on trade and welfare than can be guessed from NRP, 
ERP or PSE/CSE estimates. 
                                                 
3 ERAs have been published for all Australian manufacturing industries at the 2-, 3- and 4-digit levels 
of disaggregation each year since 1968-69, for all rural industries since 1970-71, and occasionally also 
for mining industries (whose ERAs are close to or below zero). Details can be freely downloaded from 
the website of Australia’s Productivity Commission (formerly named the Tariff Board, the Industries 
Assistance Commission, and the Industry Commission), at www.pc.gov.au. The Commission also 
estimates and publishes the consumer tax equivalent of industry assistance policy measures including 
the tariff. The availability of such comprehensive estimates of ERAs has made it easier to use the 
economics of politics to explain the intra-sectoral pattern of assistance to industries. See, for example, 
Anderson (1978, 1980). 
4 The PSE attempts to take into account all forms of support to producers, not just the producer price-
raising effect of a tariff on import-competing products. The OECD expresses its aggregate value as a 
percentage of total producer receipts for each commodity, and so it approaches only 100 per cent as the 
NRP approaches infinity (Anderson 1995a). Presumably the OECD members with the highest rates of 
protection to agriculture lobbied for the use of that denominator, rather than value at international 
prices which would not cap the PSE, so as to de-emphasise the inter-country differences in aggregate 
protection levels. 4
 
  To see why the TRI is more informative, notice two difficulties with the NRP 
by considering first Figure 1(a), which shows a country’s domestic demand and 
supply curves (Di and Si) for two goods (i = 1 or 2). Assume for simplicity of 
exposition (and without loss of generality) that the only forms of intervention in this 
small, otherwise open economy are import restrictions such as tariffs, which raise the 
domestic prices to OiPi’, above the border prices of OiPi. The PSE in percentage terms 
in this case is 100(OiPi’ - OiPi)/OiPi’ and equals the negative of the CSE, and the NRP 
is 100(OiPi’ - OiPi)/OiPi. As drawn, these indicators are numerically smaller for good 
1 than for good 2. Yet the trade effects of the tariffs as drawn are larger for good 1 
than for good 2 (a1b1 + c1d1 > a2b2 + d2e2), so the NRP or PSE/CSE rankings would 
give the wrong impression of the ranking of trade effects of intervention as between 
these two goods.  
The second difficulty has to do with obtaining an aggregate trade effect: what 
weights should be used to calculate the average NRP so as to indicate the size of the 
trade effect? Candidates include actual production, or consumption, or imports, each 
valued at border prices. Assuming for simplicity that both goods have a border price 
of $1 and tariff-distorted production of one unit, the production weights are equal and 
the weighted average NRP would be half way between the NRPs for the two goods. 
That is also the case in Figure 1(b), which is for another country that is identical to 
that shown in Figure 1(a) except that the larger tariff in this second country is applied 
to the market for the good with the more elastic import demand. Yet the trade effects 
are larger in Figure 1(b) than Figure 1(a). That is, if the production-weighted average 
NRP is used to infer trade effects for two countries that were identical except for 
which of the two goods had the higher tariff, they would be considered equally trade-
distorting whereas the country represented in Figure 1(b) is more trade-distorting. If 
instead consumption or import weights were to be used, different average NRPs 
would in general be calculated. There is no obvious reason to prefer one over the 
other two, nor to prefer an average of them, for drawing trade inferences. Similar 
comments can be made if the net economic welfare effect rather than the trade effect 
was the item of interest. 
Anderson and Neary (1994) follow Corden (1966) in their suggestion that a 
more satisfactory approach to measuring trade restrictiveness is to find the uniform 
tariff for the two goods that would be equivalent -- in the sense of yielding the same 
domestic welfare loss -- to the actual tariffs applied. The welfare loss is the sum of 
areas aibici and dieifi for each good in Figure 1(a) or 1(b). That is equivalent to area 
aibici in Figure 2(a) or 2(b) which shows the import (or excess) demand curves for 
each good in the two countries, MDi, obtained by subtracting the domestic supply 
from the domestic demand at each price. The uniform tariff in Figure 2(a) is equal to 
PiPi* where its greater welfare cost of a1c1d1e1 compared with the actual tariff 
situation for good 1 just equals the lesser welfare cost of a2c2d2e2 compared with the 
actual tariff situation for good 2, and conversely in Figure 2(b). Notice that this 
welfare-equivalent uniform tariff is closer to the actual tariff on the more-elastic good 
1 than to that on good 2 in both countries, and hence is below the average NRP in the 
first country but above the average NRP in the second country. This result accords 
with the intuition that tariffs on relatively elastic goods are more trade-restrictive than 
tariffs on relatively inelastic goods. The only additional pieces of information required 
to calculate this simplest of TRIs in addition to the NRP, or PSE and CSE, are the 
price elasticities of domestic demand and supply or the excess demand elasticity for 
each good. 5
 
The proponents have gone further in showing how it is possible to generate 
more complex TRIs, including general equilibrium versions, that are increasingly 
more satisfactory in terms of their theoretical basis and internal consistency.
5  
How much difference is there in practice between the TRI and the PSE/CSE 
measures? In an earlier paper, Anderson and Bannister (1992) reported partial 
equilibrium measures of the change in trade restrictiveness of substantial changes in 
Mexican agricultural policy between 1985 and 1989. Over that four-year period of 
reform their estimate of the TRI fell by 41 per cent, whereas the conventionally 
estimated PSE and CSE fell only 15 and 1 per cent, respectively. The authors 
decomposed the TRI change into changes in the analogous or ‘consistent’ producer 
and consumer subsidy equivalents, which were -31 and -72 per cent, respectively. 
That is, consumer subsidies were reduced drastically and producer support was cut by 
less than half as much, yet Mexico’s agricultural policy became substantially less 
restrictive of imports according to the TRI indicator. The authors estimate that the 
reforms brought the sector two thirds of the way towards free trade. They tested the 
sensitivity of their TRI measure to changes in elasticity values, incidentally, and 
found their results to be quite robust. 
Like partial and general equilibrium modelling, the TRI is more likely to 
become a supplement to rather than a substitute for the NRP or PSE/CSE and ERP 
calculations, as its estimation may involve relatively little additional work and it still 
has the virtue of being a single indicator that can be described in plain words.    
 
Indicators of the extent of nontariff trade barriers 
 
  The phasing down of bound tariffs since the first GATT round of multilateral 
trade negotiations (from above 40 per cent to less than 4 per cent for imports of 
manufactures by OECD countries over the past 55 years) has reduced dramatically 
their relative importance over time. Applied tariffs have fallen even more than the 
rates bound in GATT/WTO schedules. Non-tariff trade barriers (NTBs), on the other 
hand, have been slower to eradicate, and new NTBs are being added or threatened 
each year (Laird and Yeats 1990; Baldwin 1991; Laird 1997). Particularly difficult to 
measure are technical product or process standards when products are heterogeneous, 
because domestic-to-border price comparisons are inadequate when there are not 
‘like’ products to compare. This is a current challenge the World Bank and others are 
focusing on (see, for example, Maskus and Wilson 2001). 
 
Indicators of the extent of indirect protection via exchange rate distortions 
 
  Distortions to exchange rates also affect the domestic price of tradables 
relative to nontradables (Corden 1981). Drawing on a World Bank multi-country 
study of distortions to agricultural incentives, Krueger, Valdes and Schiff (1988) 
show that for their sample of 18 developing countries, overvalued exchange rates 
have been far more significant anti-agricultural and anti-trade instruments than tariffs, 
import quotas, import licensing and other direct forms of assistance or taxation of 
farm products combined. Even in Sub-Saharan Africa where direct taxation of 
agricultural exports had been huge (averaging 23 per cent in the 1960-84 period), the 
indirect discrimination against farming because of overvalued exchange rates was 
                                                 
5 See Anderson and Neary (1994) for details, and their diskettes for spreadsheet versions that are ready 
to use on a personal computer. 6
 
even larger, at 29 per cent on average for the studied countries of that region. In total 
those taxation and foreign exchange policies meant that farmers in that poor continent 
received less than half the gross earnings of their exports – a huge rate of taxation by 
any standard. 
 
2.  Measuring the cost of protection 
 
The cost of protection, or more generally of industry assistance/taxation, refers 
to the losses imposed by all policy-induced distortions affecting directly the tradables-
producing sectors of the economy. Those distortionary measures could be not only 
trade taxes or subsidies but also production or consumption taxes or subsidies on 
products, on intermediate inputs, or on factors of production.
6 The cost is usually 
measured against free markets, including free international trade in final products and 
intermediate inputs (though not usually in productive factors). In the absence of 
distortions and if all factors are perfectly mobile between sectors, this is the optimal 
policy setting.
7 An alternative perspective is to measure it against the first-best policy 
instrument for achieving the particular ‘non-economic’ objective of society that the 
tariff is ostensibly targeting (although this is difficult if several objectives are being 
targeted simultaneously). An additional literature measures the benefits of liberalizing 
markets
8, in which case the reform usually is measured against either current policies 
or what those policies otherwise would be. The latter is appropriate if, for example, 
protection was rising over time and the measurement of its effects was calibrated for a 
future year. If the experiment involves bilateral or multilateral reform, any terms of 
trade changes associated with other countries’ reforms need to be included in the 
calculus. 
Three of the early attempts to measure the cost of protection were for sectors 
where rates of protection were very high by international standards: Australian 
manufacturing (Brigden et al. 1929), Canadian manufacturing (Young 1957), and 
German agriculture (Gerschenkron 1943). In critiquing the Brigden study, Corden 
(1957) developed what might be considered the first comprehensive methodology 
which, with the seminal paper by Johnson (1960), has provided the foundation for 
subsequent empirical analysis of the cost of protection in both partial and general 
equilibrium.  
The cost of tariff protection consists primarily of a production component and 
a consumption component (in partial equilibrium the Harberger (1959) deadweight 
welfare cost triangles, such as abc and def in Figure 1 for a small economy). Such 
measures are an improvement over earlier calculations that measured just the cash 
value of the producer subsidy equivalent or consumer tax equivalent (the price wedge 
times the volume of production or consumption, e.g. PbcP’ or PdfP’ in Figure 1). 
They usually ignore the costs of lobbying for and then administering the tariff, and of 
‘leakages’ in such forms as corruption at the customs post and smuggling. The vast 
majority of empirical studies also usually assume that perfect competition and 
constant returns to scale operate, thereby underestimating the cost of protection in so 
                                                 
6 A comprehensive taxonomy is provided in Bhagwati (1971). See also Vousden (1990). 
7 However, to the extent trade in factors is complementary with rather than a substitute for trade in 
products, the counterfactual should be broadened to include unrestricted factor trade too. Compare, for 
example, Mundell (1957) with Markusen (1983); but note that the outcome when both product and 
factor trade are opened up is not obvious (Michaely 2002). 
8 Major efforts to examine the effects of trade liberalizations in developing countries include Bhagwati 
(1978), Krueger (1978), and Michaely, Papageorgiou and Choksi (1991). 7
 
far as imperfect competition and increasing returns are present. Nonetheless, this 
basic approach has been the workhorse of countless partial equilibrium studies of the 
cost of protection and, as the popularity of studies such as those sponsored by the 
Institute for International Economics shows, they have great appeal to the policy 
community. That appeal no doubt is partly because the approach is relatively easy to 
explain. 
When import quotas or voluntary export restraints (VERs) are used as the 
protective instrument instead of a tariff, the costs of a given level of protection are 
higher. What would have been the tariff revenue (area bdfc in Figure 1) becomes the 
quota rent which, in the case of VERs, is transferred to the foreigner. In the numerous 
cases where large countries are imposing such quantitative trade barriers, there are 
also terms of trade effects to consider (as there are also with a tariff). They can lead to 
efficiency losses for the exporting countries that more than offset the quota rent 
transfer -- as found in several of the US studies of VERs surveyed by Feenstra (1992). 
They also lead to extra losses (a) if the quotas are volume based because that measure 
encourages the exporting of more-processed or higher-quality products within the 
product group for each quota, (b) if the quotas are allocated (rather than auctioned) 
but not to the lowest-cost exporting countries, (c) if the licences to fill an exporting 
country’s quota are allocated (rather than auctioned) but not to the lowest-cost firms 
in that country, (d) if the quota leads to additional lobbying, in this case for an 
allocation of the quota, that erodes the rent transfer, and (e) if the VER encourages 
inefficient foreign direct investment (FDI) in the importing country in lieu of 




3.  Measuring other economic effects of protection 
 
With the growth in computing power, the economics profession has been able 
to go well beyond measuring just the cost of protection. Single-commodity, single-
country partial-equilibrium studies have been supplemented and often superseded by 
the development of multi-commodity industry or sectoral models of world markets in 
partial equilibrium, and economy-wide single- or multi-country computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) models. Agricultural modelling in the 1980s is discussed below as 
a good example of the former, before attention turns to CGE developments. 
 
Partial equilibrium global modelling: the case of agricultural markets 
 
The impetus to develop global models of agricultural markets came in the 
early 1980s as it became clear that agriculture was likely be included in a substantial 
way in the up-coming (Uruguay) round of multilateral trade negotiations – a first 
since the GATT began in the late 1940s (Josling, Tangermann and Warley 1996). The 
first such model, by Valdes and Zietz (1980), was a direct application of the 
Corden/Harberger/Johnson partial equilibrium methodology for a large number of 
agricultural products. However, each product market was considered independent of 
the others (zero cross-price elasticities). A model that took interdependence into 
account was developed by Tyers (1984) for grain and meat markets and applied 
initially to analyse the European Community’s Common Agricultural Policy 
(Anderson and Tyers 1984). That model was subsequently expanded to include the 
                                                 
9 On the relative inefficiency of quotas over tariffs, see Anderson (1985, 1988). 8
 
highly protected sugar and dairy sectors and became the basis for the empirical work 
reported in the World Bank’s 1986 World Development Report in time for the launch 
of the Uruguay Round in September that year (Tyers and Anderson 1986). 
Meanwhile, several international agencies and the US Department of Agriculture 
began building similar models,
10 but they were mostly comparative static and 
deterministic. By contrast, the Tyers/Anderson model was dynamic and stochastic, 
and it also included international-to-domestic price transmission elasticities to capture 
the insulation effect of agricultural trade policies in addition to their protective 
effect.
11  
Even though these models did not distinguish internationally traded products 
by country of origin, as proposed by Armington (1969), they were very influential in 
raising public awareness during the Uruguay Round of the impact of growth of 
agricultural protection levels in the 1980s on farm production, consumption and trade, 
on the mean and variance of domestic and international food prices, and on national 
and global economic welfare (as measured by equivalent variations in income). 
The estimated costs of protection as captured by those models was probably a 
reasonable economic welfare measure for advanced industrial countries, because 
agriculture is a small part of those economies and the distortions to non-farm tradable 
sectors is small relative to those for agriculture. For poorer countries, however, 
agriculture is a much larger share of GDP and employment, and their industrial and 
service sectors are often highly protected from import competition. In such cases, a 
cut in low levels of agricultural protection could actually worsen national economic 
welfare, yet such partial equilibrium models would suggest there would be an 
economic gain (Martin 1997). Also, multilateral agricultural reform is not undertaken 
in isolation but – since the Uruguay Round at least -- as part of a package of trade 
reforms affecting all sectors. For these reasons, partial equilibrium global models 
began to be superseded from the early 1990s as CGE models became more 
disaggregated with the growth in capacity and speed of computers and in the quality 
of the needed data. Initial efforts to apply CGE models to agricultural protection 
issues are reported in Goldin and Knudsen (1990), but the quality of the models and 
applications rose dramatically over the 1990s. 
 
CGE national and global models 
 
 The first CGE models began appearing in the 1970s, and by the early 1980s 
they were being used routinely for policy analysis in a number of OECD countries. 
For example, the first model build for Australia, known as ORANI (Dixon et al. 
1982), produced results for a wide range of policy issues and made a major impact on 
policy debate during the microeconomic reform decade of the 1980s (Powell and 
Snape 1993). As noted in the surveys by Shoven and Whalley (1984) and Robinson 
(1989), models were also beginning to be built at that time for developing countries, 
an early example being Dervis, de Melo and Robinson (1982). Since then many of 
these national models have become far more sophisticated, and in particular have 
added regional, occupational and household disaggregations and have become 
dynamic (as for example in the transforming of the Australian ORANI model into the 
                                                 
10 They included the USDA’s SWOPSIM model (Roningen 1986), IIASA’s model (Parikh et al. 1987) 
and the OECD’s Trade Mandate Model (Huff and Moreddu 1989).  
11 Full details of the model including the welfare calculus, and its database and protection estimates, are 
provided in Tyers and Anderson (1992). A survey of these models is provided in Tongeren, Meijl and 
Surry (2001). 9
 
MONASH model – see Dixon and Rimmer 1998). The latter feature allows 
forecasting though time and hence can show paths of adjustment to shocks.  
Global CGE models were slower in coming, since they require so much more 
data than national or regional models. Early examples are Whalley (1985) and 
Deardorff and Stern (1986, 1990), with the latter having more country and commodity 
detail. The Australian Government’s Industry Commission also began building a 
global CGE model for trade negotiating purposes (the SALTER model – see Jomini et 
al. 1991). A copy of that model was taken to Purdue University and, since the early 
1990s, it has been improving constantly and been made publicly available as the so-
called GTAP model and database (Global Trade Analysis Project – see Hertel 1997). 
The extraordinary efforts by Tom Hertel to train users and recruit willing helpers to 
revise and update the production, trade and protection data and improve the theory in 
the model has resulted in hundreds of people becoming users and thousands of 
simulation experiments being published over the decade since its creation (see 
www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/). That openness, which has been characteristic of some 
other CGE modelling groups too, has been a great spur to modelling innovations. 
The basic global GTAP model is similar in architecture to the Australian 
ORANI model, but more complex versions are being developed all the time. Among 
the modifications that have been incorporated for particular applications are scale 
economies and imperfect competition (Francois 1998), dynamics through capital 
accumulation (Francois and McDonald 1996), and those plus foreign direct 
investment (Dee, Hanslow and Phamduc 2000). In addition, computational tools for 
practical policy analysis have been developed to enable systematic sensitivity analysis 
(Pearson and Arndt 2000) and decomposition of economic welfare results (Huff and 
Hertel 2001). Trade and related policy analysis is now possible for any of the 66 
countries or country groups in Version 5 of the GTAP model and any of its 57 sectors 
of production (20 agricultural and processed food sectors, 22 other manufacturing 
sectors, and 15 services sectors). Since Armington elasticities are included, bilateral 
as well as total trade effects can be explored. This enables far more sophisticated 
analyses for bilateral, regional and multilateral trade negotiations than was possible 
only a few years ago. 
GTAP is of course not the only such CGE model, but it is certainly the most 
widely used. Others were also used in the ex post analysis of the Uruguay Round (see 
the various chapters in Martin and Winters 1996) and are now being used for ex ante 
analyses of the current WTO round of trade negotiations and the numerous bilateral 
and regional free-trade-area proposals that have become fashionable again in recent 
years. 
Another popular family of models arose from expanding a global macro model 
by adding some sectoral detail (McKibbin and Wilcoxen 1995). While having far 
fewer sectors and regions than GTAP, and while relying heavily on the GTAP 
database, the McKibbin family of models includes capital markets and is dynamic and 
so is able to generate paths of adjustment to simulated shocks. As in dynamic national 
CGE models, the latter feature has obvious appeal to policymakers concerned with the 
short to medium term effects of reform on their constituents.   
 
4.  Where to from here? 
 
Notwithstanding the enormous progress that has been made in the 45 years 
since Corden first published his paper on calculating the cost of protection, much 
scope for improvement remains. Theoretical developments have been running well 10
 
ahead of empirical modelling, as the Feenstra (1995) survey and the final six chapters 
of Francois and Reinert (1997) make clear. Data developments and parameter 
estimation have been relatively slow (an international public good problem), as have 
efforts to specify well the policy instruments being modelled in both the base and 
reform scenarios. We begin with the latter, since it has been a major source of 
criticism of Uruguay Round modelling.
12 
 
Improving the specification of existing and alternative policy measures 
 
Several mis-specifications of policy measures are clear from the ex post and 
especially the ex ante modelling of Uruguay Round (UR) reforms. First, UR (as with 
past GATT and future WTO) commitments relate to reductions in bound tariff rates, 
not applied rates, and bound rates can be higher (in agriculture’s case often several 
times higher) than applied rates. Yet many modellers used applied rates in calibrating 
their models and then reduced them by the extent of the promised bound tariff cuts, 
thereby overstating the magnitude of reform – in some cases by a huge margin. The 
recent efforts by UNCTAD, the World Bank and others to estimate both sets of tariffs 
will hopefully allow modellers to solve this problem in the near future if sufficient 
funding is provided by those international agencies. 
Second, a wide array of tariff preferences operate for various groups of 
developing country exporters and among members of preferential-trade areas.
13 Often 
in the past these have been ignored by modellers. Again this has been because such 
data have not been available in a form that modellers could readily use. While some 
efforts are being made currently to rectify that, the problem will not easily be solved 
because many of the poor developing countries enjoying preferential (in many cases 
duty-free) access to markets of rich countries are small and so do not appear 
separately in global CGE models but rather as part of a group of developing   
countries. 
Third, it is in agriculture where most of the remaining gains from goods trade 
liberalization are to be found.
14 Reforming that sector should have been 
straightforward following the promised tariffication of all nontariff agricultural trade 
barriers following the UR, but such is not the case. The reason is that governments 
agreed to allow countries to set their bound tariff at excessively high levels so long as 
they promised at least existing levels of imports to come in at low tariffs. That 
triggered the use of so-called tariff rate quotas (TRQs). As the Appendix makes clear, 
TRQs add considerable complexity to modelling empirically even the domestic 
impacts of agricultural trade policies and their reform, let alone their trade effects. In 
short: 
                                                 
12 Criticism has come even from within the international economics profession. See, for example, 
Panagariya (1999). 
13 Preferences also apply to trade among WTO members relative to their trade with non-members, since 
most members have a general tariff rate that exceeds the most-favoured-nation bound rate that WTO 
members enjoy. This distinction has become unimportant with the growth in the number of nations that 
are WTO members, however, especially now that most non-members (with the important exceptions of 
Russia and Saudi Arabia) are least developed countries enjoying other forms of preferential access. 
WTO members now account for more than 95 per cent of world trade. 
14 According to GTAP modelling results reported in Anderson (2002a), fully two-thirds of the gains 
from eliminating all merchandise import barriers globally in 2005, after full implementation of 
Uruguay Round commitments, would come from agriculture.  11
 
•  in the presence of TRQs the national welfare cost of agricultural protection 
can be considerably greater than what a given domestic-to-border price 
wedge would imply if a tariff-only regime prevailed; 
•  modelling an x per cent cut in the bound tariff as if it is a cut of that size in 
the applied rate can overstate the price and quantity effects of reform not 
only because the bound rate exceeds the applied rate but also because the 
applied rate may be above the prohibitive tariff in the presence of the 
quota, such that the actual effects could range (in a kinked non-linear 
fashion) from anything between zero to 100 per cent of the modelled 
effects;  
•  the modelled effects of a tariff cut on national welfare, by contrast, could 
understate or overstate the gains from further reform, depending on how 
the quota is being administered before and after the next reform; 
•  an expansion of the market access (quota) commitment need not ease this 
measurement problem, for it is always possible for the quota administrator 
to allocate those quotas so as to ensure under-fill such that no more or even 
less imports in total flow in; and 
•  modelling the effects of the TRQ regime, and changes to it, on bilateral 
trade flows and thereby on the welfare of this economy’s trading partners 
also is more complex than modelling their effects under a tariff-only 
regime, with in-quota and out-of-quota tariff preferences for some trading 
partners adding further complications for modellers.   
Fourth, an additional complication for modelling agriculture is that many 
countries impose quarantine restrictions and even bans on imports of farm products. 
Hence even if the bound rates and TRQs had been correctly modelled, the results may 
still overstate what would actually happen following tariff cuts and TRQ expansions if 
those quarantine restrictions begin to bite. It will be a long time before we have a 
comprehensive usable data base showing the extent of protection afforded by such 
nontariff barriers, even though it may be even larger than that due to the bound tariff 
on numerous farm products. This problem will escalate as and when food safety 
process standards (eg for GMOs) become more widespread, since the concept of ‘like 
product’ will come under challenge. Similar protective effects result from technical 
barriers to trade on non-farm products. The Uruguay Round’s Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Agreement and Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement have only gone 
a small way towards disciplining the abuse of these forms of trade protection. 
Fifth, safeguards may be applied under certain circumstances such as import 
surges. That may well be how the US and/or EU respond when the present voluntary 
export restraints on textile and clothing trade are removed under the UR Agreement 
on Textiles and Clothing at the end of 2005  (or a few years later for China and 
possibly other WTO accedants such as Vietnam). That possibility should be kept in 
mind when modelling manufacturing liberalizations.  
And sixth, most models have ignored or at best captured only very crudely the 
distortions to services trade and investment flows. Those barriers are considerable, but 
are difficult to measure and represent in standard CGE models (see Hoekman 1996; 
Findlay and Warren 2000; Dee et al. 2000). Yet when those distortions are not 
included, there is the same problem with interpreting the welfare effects of goods 
trade reform generated by a CGE model as there is from a partial equilibrium model 
of a subset of markets in the presence of distortions in other markets of that economy. 
That is, if services distortions greatly exceed goods protection then decreasing the 
latter could worsen national economic welfare even though a CGE model which 12
 
specifies zero distortions for services markets will suggest a welfare gain from a 
goods protection cut. The only solution to this problem is to continue to build on the 
pioneering work reported in Findlay and Warren (2000) on measuring the extent of 
distortions to markets for services and that of Dee and others in incorporating those 
measures into CGE models. 
  
Effects of trade reform in the presence of other domestic divergences 
 
In addition to services markets being distorted, many other domestic markets 
are typically distorted by government policies or labour union/management 
agreements. Ideally those distortions should all be specified in each model, but that is 
a formidable task. In the meantime, in describing model outputs there should always 
be the caveat that the results are exaggerated to the extent that there are domestic 
distortions that would inhibit actual market adjustments to reduced trade barriers.  
As well, there may be divergences (to use Corden’s (1974) term) in the form 
of environmental or social concerns that the government has not optimally addressed. 
That too can lead to smaller actual social welfare gains than our economic models 
might suggest, or even to losses, from trade liberalization (eg if there is a sufficiently 
large and uncorrected negative environmental externality associated with producing 
more exportables). Proponents of the idea that agriculture is ‘multifunctional’, and for 
that reason deserves government support, try to make that claim (Anderson 1998). 
Distinguishing between genuine widespread environmental or social concerns, and the 
claims of self-serving vested interests, is not always easy in practice. 
 
Imperfect competition and scale economies 
 
A more-widespread incorporation in CGE models of imperfect competition 
and scale economies (following the example set by modellers of the European 
Union’s Single Market in the 1990s) would accelerate if we had better empirical 
estimates of the mark-ups firms impose and the extent of economies of scale in 
different industries. These modifications are especially crucial for the services sector, 
as is the incorporation of foreign direct investment flows. Hence the more these 
models are going to be used to analyse services policy reforms, the more important 
are those inclusions. Also needed are better data on services trade and better 
specifications of services policy measures, particularly if the GTAP database (which 
many other non-GTAP global modellers also depend on) is to be disaggregated 
beyond the 15 services sectors in the current Version 5. 
 
Dynamics of trade liberalization 
 
Including capital accumulation and thereby making global CGE models 
dynamic is a tall order (see, e.g., Grossman and Helpman 1991), but it would open up 
opportunities to address additional issues. One is the intergenerational transfers that 
could result from tariff reforms affecting asset values. Those effects would depend on 
any terms of trade changes and hence are affected by whether a small economy’s 
liberalization is unilateral or part of a multilateral reform package. Another issue such 
a model could handle better than present ones is selective temporary protection (of 
which anti-dumping is perhaps the most notorious). A third issue, and one that is 
important for poorer countries, is the greater scope there would be to assess ways of 
accommodating the revenue consequences of tariff changes, including via debt 13
 
financing (Keuschnigg and Kohler 1997). And forth, estimates of the costs of 
adjustment over time could be more-easily incorporated. 
But perhaps the most important contribution that dynamic models could make 
is to show how much greater are the gains from trade liberalization than is apparent 
from comparative static models,
15 and how little are the adjustments needed because 
of trade reform relative to those due to the normal pace of structural changes that 
accompany economic growth.  
 
Effects on factor markets and especially wages and employment 
 
  The evident concern about the possibility that trade reform could have adverse 
impacts on wages and/or employment for lower-skilled workers in developed 
countries has attracted considerable interest of analysts in general (see Greenaway and 
Nelson 2001) but less interest from empirical CGE modellers than one might expect 
even though in principle CGE models are well served to provide insights. The 
problem in practice is that the factor market assumptions used by many modellers are 
often rather simplistic (and horrify labour economists): full employment before and 
after the policy shock, a perfectly inelastic supply curve for labour, few if any skill 
differentials or sector-specific skills, costless adjustment to shocks, and often no 
minimum wages or any other factor market distortions. Parading factor market results 
would require exposing those assumptions (and those assumed for land and capital 
markets). Clearly these factor market issues should be being dealt with for the sake of 
getting better trade and welfare results anyway, so if greater demands for such 
modelling results lead to more-realistic specifications of factor and especially labour 
markets, that will be a doubly good thing. And in any case it is needed for responding 
also to the next point. 
 
Effects on household and regional income disparities and poverty alleviation 
 
  The Seattle debacle in late 1999 and the protests at numerous global economic 
leaders’ meetings since then make clear that there is a strong demand for empirical 
modellers to say something also about the impact of shocks such as trade policy 
reform on the distribution of incomes across households and regions within each 
country, and in particular on the incidence of poverty, especially in poorer countries. 
That requires going beyond calculating just factorial income distributional effects. It 
requires including utility functions for several instead of just a single household. 
Inputs into that specification could be household survey data for urban and rural areas, 
from which it may be possible to estimate the shares of different (say) quintiles or 
deciles of households’ incomes from different productive factors and from 




Domestic policy responses to trade reform 
                                                 
15 Developing countries that have opened up relatively rapidly have seen their incomes converge 
toward OECD levels faster than others. See, for example, the evidence surveyed in Dollar (1992), 
Edwards (1993, 1998), Greenaway et al. (1998), Harrison (1996), USITC (1997), and Winters (2000a). 
16 Recent examples of modelling exercises along these lines are Friedman (2000) and Hertel et al. 
(2000). Will Martin is currently managing a large World Bank research project along similar lines, 




Having identified the gainers and any losers from a trade policy change, one 
could draw on our understanding of the political economy of economic policy 
formation to anticipate what additional policy changes might be forthcoming in 
response to the trade liberalization. Those responses could then also be modelled.  
At the same time, the likely effects of other potential domestic policy changes 
that might be needed to meet society’s economic, social and environmental objectives 
could be presented alongside results for the trade reform, to show how any adverse 
effects from that reform might be most-efficiently dealt with. This step may be very 
important if the results of the ex ante trade reform simulation are seen as politically 
unpalatable, because otherwise the government may choose simply to abandon its 
trade reform plan. 
 
5.  Has better measurement led to more trade policy reform? 
 
  Cynics will say that we have known about the gains from trade for more than 
two centuries and yet trade restrictions remain, while advocates for empirical research 
will point to and claim some credit for the remarkable extent of trade liberalization 
that has occurred globally over the past half-century. The relevant question is: how 
much credit can be claimed by the empiricists? There is no way of answering this 
precisely, but a few points are worth making.  
First, revealing the fact that Australia and New Zealand had the most protected 
industrial sectors among the OECD countries until the 1980s – and noting that they 
were the slowest-growing of the OECD economies in the post-war period -- was 
helpful in bringing down their protection levels during the past two decades. The 
same is true of the comparison between the less-protected and faster-growing 
developing countries of East Asia post-1960 and the more-protected and slower-
growing ones elsewhere. 
Second, revealing the extent of effective protection to agriculture relative to 
manufacturing in key OECD countries, and of the industrial sector relative to primary 
sectors in many developing countries, helped to alter the domestic political economy 
forces in both sets of countries. The large increase in the farmer/manufacturer 
assistance gap in OECD countries between the end of the GATT’s Tokyo Round and 
the start of its Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations also helped to ensure 
agricultural protectionism was placed and remained high on the agenda of the UR. 
Third, revealing the vast across-industry differences within sectors of 
protection rates, which were much bigger than the differences in nominal rates, helped 
governments to resist domestic pressures in their country to maintain or raise 
protection for the most assisted groups. 
And fourth, empirical estimates of the consumer and net welfare costs of 
protection have made it easier for advocates of reform to gain headlines than when 
relying on only abstract arguments about the gains from trade, while estimates of the 
cost of protection to non-protected industries and to exporters abroad have helped 
build coalitions for trade liberalization. 
If economists are to be any more influential, they need to understand better 
why governments intervene in markets, for as Stigler (1975, p. xi) says, ‘Until we 
understand why our society adopts its policies, we will be poorly equipped to give 15
 
useful advice on how to change those policies’.
17 The availability of effective rate of 
assistance estimates, and now of CGE models (especially if they are embellished in 
ways mentioned in the previous section), make it easier to address questions such as 
why some industries or sectors are assisted or taxed more than others and why and 
how the pattern of industry assistance changes in the course of economic development 




Clearly, while empirical trade modellers within the international economics 
profession have come a long way since the late 1950s, plenty of exciting challenges 
remain for empirical modellers interested in having an impact on the real world of 
trade policy reform. A key to further progress, though, is an expansion in investment 
in a key international public good required by modellers, namely, data that can be 
readily used in CGE models to capture the intricacies of the policy measures countries 
have adopted. The highest priorities would be agricultural and services protection 
data, since they remain the two key sectors where protectionism is still substantial and 
where the protective effects of the measures used are still difficult to model.  
 
                                                 
17 Corden understood that: he wrote an early paper on the logic of tariff protection (Corden 1962), and 
then developed the concept of a conservative social welfare function (Corden 1974). He also went to 
some trouble to explain the trade liberalizations of both Australia and developing countries (Corden 
1995). A not-unimportant contributing factor was the freeing of exchange rates, which allowed the 
required exchange rate depreciation to more-easily accompany tariff cuts (Little, Cooper, Corden and 




Effects of a tariff rate quota regime on the domestic price, 
trade and welfare of an agricultural-importing economy 
 
 
  Under the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) some WTO 
members have imposed a tariff rate quota (TRQ) regime on certain farm products. 
That involves setting a bound tariff (typically more than the tariff actually applied) on 
out-of-quota sales and a lower in-quota tariff for a specified volume of imports. The 
initial impact of imposing such a TRQ regime is depicted in Figure 3, where this 
economy’s import demand curve for the product is line D. For simplicity, the 
economy is assumed to be a sufficiently small player in the global market for this 
product that its imports do not affect the international price, and its in-quota tariff is 
assumed to be zero, in which case the quota volume, Q, is imported at the 
international price P*.  
If this was an import quota regime (now illegal under WTO), the domestic 
price would be Pq and the national economic welfare loss from restricting imports to 
Q, instead of allowing the free-trade volume Q*, would be area abc plus a percentage 
of the potential quota rent which is area bcde. What that latter percentage is depends 
on how the import licenses are administered: it is zero only if all licenses go to the 
lowest-cost domestic firms and those firms are allowed to import from the lowest-cost 
suppliers abroad. (By contrast, if say only Q2 of the Q units were allocated to 
domestic firms, the national welfare loss would be greater by area bcrj.)  
It is possible to achieve the same outcome under a TRQ regime as under a 
traditional import quota. In terms of Figure 3, all that is required is to set the out-of-
quota applied tariff (and therefore the bound rate) at Pq – P* per unit or more.  
Only if the out-of-quota applied tariff is set at a value of less than Pq – P* per 
unit would there be any out-of-quota imports under a TRQ regime. If the applied rate 
was set at the specific rate of t1 per unit, for example, the domestic price would be P* 
+ t1 and an additional Q1 – Q units would be imported. Compared with a prohibitive 
out-of-quota tariff, this would generate less potential quota rent (lower by area cdhg) 
but would cause domestic consumer surplus net of domestic producer surplus to be 
higher by area cdhf, and tariff revenue of area fgbn would be collected by the 
government. Hence net economic welfare would be greater by area fcbn as compared 
with no out-of-quota imports, again assuming all licenses go to lowest-cost domestic 
firms and those firms are free to source imports from the lowest-cost suppliers abroad. 
If some licenses are made valid only for imports from high-cost foreign 
suppliers (as applies for some products under the European Union’s agreement with 
ACP countries, for example), this importing economy’s welfare would be further 
reduced. It could be reduced by even more than the maximum quota rent for volume 
Q (area bcde). Suppose, for example, the licenses are restricted to imports from a set 
of countries whose export supply curve measured at cif prices is line S. Even if the 
out-of-quota applied tariff was more than t2, those foreign suppliers could afford to 
export only Q2 units to this economy, causing the domestic price to be P* + t2 rather 
than Pq because of the quota being underfilled by Q – Q2 units. In this case there 
would be no quota rents, and the net economic welfare cost of imposing such a TRQ 
regime would be much larger than described in the previous two paragraphs. 
Specifically, compared with free trade, the welfare cost of this regime would be area 17
 
aemk, regardless of whether the licenses are allocated to domestic or foreign firms, 
whereas the cost of the regimes described in paragraphs one and two are potentially 
just areas abc and anf, respectively. To that needs to be added the cost to government 
of administering the license allocation system and the lobbying costs of firms seeking 
a share of those licenses. 
 
Effects of a new commitment to lower the bound out-of-quota tariff 
 
Suppose at the end of the URAA implementation period/the current Doha 
Round negotiations (which coincide on 1 January 2005) this economy commits itself 
to lower its bound tariff on this product. If a tariff-only regime was in place, the 
impacts of that reform would be somewhere between zero and 100 per cent of the 
impacts of an equally large cut in the applied tariff, depending on the extent to which 
the bound rate exceeds that applied rate. (The proportion starts to rise above zero only 
after the bound rate is brought down to the applied rate.) In the presence of a TRQ 
regime, however, the impacts are even smaller if the out-of-quota tariff is still 
prohibitive. Indeed even if licenses were held by domestic firms and imports were 
sourced from the most efficient suppliers, there would be no impact at all from that 
reform commitment if the cut in the bound rate was insufficient to bring the applied 
tariff down to less than Pq – P* in Figure 3. The maximum impacts are possible only 
if the out-of-quota applied tariff is not prohibitive and the bound rate is not above the 
applied rate. 
If there were (a) restrictions on sourcing from lowest-cost suppliers, and/or (b) 
only some of the quota (say Q2) was allocated to domestic firms, the welfare gains 
from bringing the applied tariff down to a non-prohibitive level would be substantially 
greater than without those features of quota administration. For example, if the tariff 
was reduced from more than t2 to just t1, there would be an additional gain of (a) area 
bemkc if the requirement on domestic firms to source from high-cost imports along 
curve S was removed, and (b) area gcrw if only Q2 of the quota licenses were in the 
hands of domestic firms. 
 
Effects of a new commitment to expand the quota 
 
  Even more than a commitment to lower the bound tariff, a commitment to 
expand the quota could have anything between zero and more than 100 per cent of the 
standard impact described in textbooks. If the quota had not been administered 
frictionlessly in the past and had not been fully allocated to domestic firms, and there 
were changes in favour of domestic importers as part of the new commitment, the 
economy’s actual welfare gain could exceed the maximum gain normally estimated 
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Figure 1: Domestic demand and supply for two imported goods 
 
(a) First country: negative correlation between tariff rates and import demand elasticities 
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(b) Second country: positive correlation between tariff rates and import demand elasticities 
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Figure 2: Import demand for two imported goods 
 
(a) First country: negative correlation between tariff rates and import demand elasticities 
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(b) Second country: positive correlation between tariff rates and import demand elasticities 
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Figure 3: Domestic price, trade and welfare effects of an agricultural tariff rate quota 
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